管科系系列讲座第191-192期预告

管科系系列讲座第191期

时间：2017年12月12日（周二）13:30

地点：史带楼304

主持人：戴悦教授

主讲嘉宾：Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis.

Title：Inter-Competitor Licensing and Product Innovation

Abstract: This paper studies how licensing of non-core technology between an incumbent and an entrant affects market competition and the entrant's optimal product quality. We show that a royalty licensing contract between the incumbent and the entrant will soften competition. More importantly, the effect of such licensing on the entrant’s optimal quality depends on whether the entrant’s core technology can significantly or only incrementally increase its quality over the incumbent’s product. The royalty contract will tend to increase the entrant’s optimal quality when the entrant’s core technology can allow for a significant quality improvement over the incumbent. By contrast, if the entrant’s technology can raise its product quality only incrementally over the incumbent’s product, the royalty licensing contract will tend to reduce the entrant’s optimal quality. A wide range of royalty contracts are mutually acceptable; the incumbent (entrant) can benefit from a licensing contract even when the entrant pays a total royalty fee that is lower (higher) than its alternative R&D cost. These results hold even when the incumbent endogenously chooses its royalty licensing fee. We show that our main results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions, e.g., alternative game sequence, endogenous quality decision by the incumbent, and alternative licensing contract.

管科系系列讲座第192期

时间：2017年12月13日（周三）13:30

地点：史带楼304

主持人：戴悦教授

主讲嘉宾：Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis.

Title：Competition of Content Acquisition and Distribution under Consumer Multi-Purchase

Abstract: In many markets, such as video streaming or information services, a consumer may purchase multiple competing products or services. The existing theoretical literature typically assumes that each consumer can buy only one product. This paper explicitly models the consumer’s multi-purchase behavior, and examines an upstream content creator’s content creation and selling strategies, and competing downstream content distributors’ acquisition and pricing strategies. We find that in contrast to the case of single-product purchase, competing content distributors under multi-product purchase will reduce their prices, and in equilibrium only one distributor will acquire the new content from the content creator. Furthermore, when the content distributors are not highly differentiated (each having a limited amount of unique content), the content creator will reduce new content creation, leading to lower profits for both the content creator and the content distributors. By contrast, when the distributors are already very differentiated with a substantial amount of unique content, the content creator will increase its content production, leading to higher profits for both the content creator and the content distributors.

管理科学系

20107-11-30