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管科系系列讲座第207-209期预告

 

管科系系列讲座第207期预告

 

时间:2018年6月11日(周一)13:30

地点:史带楼303

主持人:戴悦教授

主讲嘉宾: Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis.

Title Manufacturer’s Entry in the Product-Sharing Market

 

Abstract: Mobile communications technologies and online platforms have enabled large-scale consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of their under-utilized products. A product owner’s self-use values can differ over time, and in a period of low self-use value, the consumer may rent out her product in a product-sharing market. In response to consumer-to-consumer product sharing, many manufacturers (e.g., General Motors, BMW) have entered the product-sharing market to provide their own rental services in addition to outright sales to consumers. This paper develops an analytical framework to study a manufacturer’s optimal entry strategy in the product-sharing market and the economic implications of its entry. Our analysis shows that when C2Csharing has a low transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is not very high, the manufacturer will find it not optimal to offer its own rental services to consumers. In contrast, when the transaction cost for C2Csharing is high or the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is high, the manufacturer should offer enough units of the products for rental to squeeze outC2C sharing (in expectation). When the transaction cost for C2C sharing and the manufacturer’s marginal cost are both in the middle ranges, the manufacturer’s rental services and the C2C sharing will coexist, in which case the manufacturer’s entry in the product-sharing market may reduce the total number of units of the product in the whole market but increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare.

 

 

 

管科系系列讲座第208期预告

 

时间:2018年6月12日(周二)13:30

地点:史带楼303

主持人:戴悦教授

主讲嘉宾: Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis.

Title: Dynamic Pricing and Price Commitment of New Experience Goods

 

Abstract: This article develops a dynamic model to examine how a firm selling non-durable experience goods can signal its high quality with dynamic spot-pricing or price commitment. Since consumers who buy and use the product will learn the quality of the product, the firm’s early-period price will endogenously determine the fraction of informed consumers in the later period. Without credible price commitment, the high-quality firm prefers the pooling outcome in the first period so that in the second period the high- and low-quality firms will separate and target only their respective first-period buyers. By contrast, with credible price commitment, the high-quality firm will be able to profitably signal its quality by lowering its first-period price or raising its second-period price from its first-best price. Price commitment will benefit the high-quality firm by lowering its signaling cost, but can either increase or decrease consumer surplus and social welfare. Furthermore, we show that a longer time horizon can allow the high-quality firm to signal its quality costlessly, by maintaining its high first-best price for all periods.

 

 

 

管科系系列讲座第209期预告

 

时间:2018年6月15日(周五)10:00

地点:史带楼303

主持人:戴悦教授(商务决策与运营分析研究中心)

主讲嘉宾: Cai Gangshu, Full professor, University of Santa Clara University

Title Value of Insurance in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

 

Abstract: We investigate the value of financing insurance in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one newsvendor-like retailer, in which the retailer is capital-constrained and in need of financing from a bank. The bank is risk-averse and sets a loan limit to control its credit risk unless the retailer buys an insurance to cover the risk. The analysis reveals that the supplier will reduce the wholesale price to encourage the retailer to buy insurance and the optimal wholesale price decreases with the fixed premium, which implies that a higher fixed premium might hurt the supplier but benefit the retailer and the entire supply chain. Furthermore, if the production cost is low, the supplier is willing to share a portion of the premium when the insurance is too expensive for the retailer. Although the supplier can benefit from providing a supplier-owned insurance or trade credit, it is shown that the bank credit with third party insurance is valuable in a variety of scenarios.

 

管理科学系

2018-5-23

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