现代产业经济学系列讲座第167期

时 间:2019年3月14日(周四) 10:00-11:30

地 点:复旦大学管理学院史带楼303室

主 题:Multimarket contact under imperfect monitoring

主讲人:郑兵勇 副教授(上海财经大学)

主持人:姚志勇 副教授

摘 要: Existing theoretical researches on multimarket contact provided only a partial support to the “mutual forbearance” hypothesis. This paper considers a multimarket contact model with symmetric markets and imperfect monitoring. When the probability of punishment is conditioned upon outcomes from several markets, we show that multimarket contact fosters collusion in two aspects. First, pooling information from two or more market reduces the likelihood of retaliation resulted from observation error and increases the expected payoffs from collusion, which makes collusion more attractable. Second, and more important, the ability to strategically link retaliation across markets lowers the threshold discount factors for collusive
agreement to be self-enforcing between rival firms. Our result therefore suggests that market symmetry or inability to observe rival firms’ past actions should not be taken as evidence that engaging in multiple markets is not conducive to collusive behavior.

主讲人简介:
郑兵勇,加拿大西安大略大学经济学博士,上海财经大学经济学院常任副教授,研究领域包括微观经济理论、重复博弈论,论文发表于Rand Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior等国际学术期刊。


产业经济学系

2019-3-11