现代产业经济学系列讲座第169期

行为经济与金融研究室系列讲座

 

时 间:2019年4月9日(周二) 15:00-16:30

地 点:史带楼504室

主 题:Job Matching under Constraints 

主讲人: 孙宁 教授(南京审计大学社会与经济研究院院长)

主持人:李玲芳 副教授

摘 要:
In a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, we consider arbitrary con- straints imposed on the sets of doctors that hospitals are allowed to hire. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a “generalized interval constraint,” which is a slight generalization of an “interval constraint” that specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of doctors to be hired. If all hospitals’ demand correspondences satisfy the substitutes condition, then the set of competitive equilibria is nonempty under a mild auxiliary assumption, the equilibrium salaries form a lattice, and a rural hospital theorem holds. We obtain a general comparative statics result and apply it to the case of vary- ing interval constraints. We also show that instead of compelling hospitals to obey interval constraints, the government can entice them through appropriate subsidy and taxation.

主讲人简介:孙宁, 南京审计大学社会与经济研究院院长。主要研究领域为微观经济理论、拍卖机制设计、市场机制设计。在Econometrica、JPE等国际一流经济学期刊上发表了10多篇学术论文。2009年获教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖(人文社会科学)二等奖,2010年被聘为教育部**学者特聘教授,2013年入选新世纪百千万人才工程国家级人选,2014年入选上海市领军人才(地方队),2016年入选中央宣传部文化名家暨“四个一批”人才和国家“万人计划”哲学社会科学领军人才。

 

产业经济学系

2019-4-8