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管理科学系讲座:A Cooperative Game With Envy

时间：12月9日（周二） 13:30-15:00

地点：史带楼501

主讲人： 徐以汎，复旦大学管理科学系教授 

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a cooperative game model to study the effects of envy to the coalition formation and payoff allocation. In general, player's envy is concerned with his/her identity to the union. Player gains the utility from profit and meanwhile suffers the disutility from envy. We define the envy core in a game the set of all stable solutions which means that no one can obtain more utility through being out of the set. We discover that the nonempty of envy core is equivalent to the stability of the maximum union when the in-coalition envy is weaker than or equal to that in out-coalition. Conversely, players prefer to form various sub-unions which brings the lower efficiency in the society when the in-coalition envy is stronger than that in out-coalition. In the paper, we present some sufficient and necessary conditions of non-empty of envy core. Moreover, we find some interesting behavior features such as the strong in-coalition envy will derive players to distribute their payoff more fairly and the strong out-coalition envy will enlarge the variation of the payoff allocation. At last, we develop a mixed integer programming to solve the envy core.

 

管科系系

2014-11-26