管科系系列讲座第148期预告

时间:2015年8月13日(周四)13:30

地点:史带楼302室

主持人: 冯天俊 副教授

演讲嘉宾:Luyi Gui(Assistant professor of Operations and Decisions Technologies, The Paul Merage School of Business, University of  California, Irvine)

 

TitleDesign Incentives under Collective Extended Producer Responsibility: A Network Perspective

AbstractExtended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation aims to create incentives for producers to design products that are easier to recycle. In this paper, we study whether a collective EPR implementation, which is the dominant form in practice due to its cost efficiency advantage, can achieve this goal. In particular, we look for cost allocation mechanisms in a collective system that provide at least as effective design incentives as those induced by an individual system benchmark, while ensuring the voluntary participation of producers. Based on a biform network game model, we show that a cost allocation mechanism that satisfies the above criteria exist only if the recycling infrastructure satisfies certain properties in terms of (i) how the available recycling technologies respond to design improvements and (ii) their capacity mix relative to the return volume. Otherwise, a cost allocation mechanism that leads to effective design incentives can only guarantee participation of individual producers but not all sub-coalitions. This indicates a critical tradeoff between producers' design incentives and participation in a collective system. That is, participation by enforcement may be required for a policy maker to induce superior designs and maintain a stable collective implementation (and therefore realize its cost efficiency advantage). If this is not feasible, then one needs to accept collective implementations as enablers of cost efficiency at the expense of inferior design incentives, and find other means (i.e., other forms of regulatory intervention) besides cost allocation to provide design incentives.

 

管理科学系

2015-8-7