现代产业经济学系列讲座第159期

 

时 间:2018年11月7日(周三) 13:30-15:00

 

地 点:史带楼303室         

主 题:Non-Compete Enforceability and Non-executive Employee Stock Options

主讲人:戴芸博士 中山大学岭南(大学)学院

主持人:李玲芳 副教授

  

摘要: Non-compete clauses in employment contracts protect employers against competition by restraining employees from working for competitors. Exploiting staggered amendments of non-compete enforceability in three U.S. states, we document that stricter enforcement of non-compete clauses in a state negatively affects the value of stock options granted to non-executive employees by firms in the state. Further, this negative effect is more pronounced for firms with higher labor turnover pressure, weaker employee bargaining power, or higher uncertainty. These findings suggest that stronger non-compete enforcement weakens firms’ needs of using stock options to retain employees. Our findings reveal the importance of legal constraints on employee mobility in shaping corporate employee compensation policies.

主讲人简介:Yun Dai is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Lingnan (University) College, SunYat-sen University. She obtained her PhD diploma in Erasmus University Rotterdam.  Her research interest mainly lies in Corporate Finance, covering topics on M&A, IPOs, and Employee Compensation etc. Her studies have been published on top Economics journals such as Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, and Economic Research Journal (《经济研究》)。

 

产业经济学系

2018-10-31