德勤-复旦会计论坛系列讲座之九十四

时间:2015年12月22日(周二)下午13:30

地点:史带楼501室

主持人: 周易 博士

演讲嘉宾:Rencheng Wang  (University of Queensland)

 

TitleStrategic Disclosure and Debt Covenant Violation

 

AbstractThis study examines how managers change their forecasting behavior as a debt covenant violation approaches. Using a sample of firms that disclose a debt covenant violation (DCV) in their annual or quarterly financial statements, we find that man-agement forecast biases are larger and that forecasts are more optimistic leading up to a DCV. Additionally, firms that take more risk, experience increases in dividend payouts before the violations, or have higher risk of losing controls after the violations more likely optimistically bias their earnings forecasts, but become less likely do so if investors have greater ability to detect such bias or managers have more reputation concerns in issuing biased forecasts. Overall, our results are consistent with man-agers changing their disclosure behavior to conceal upcoming covenant violations from debtholders while also taking actions that are favorable to equity investors.

会计学系

2015-12-18