现代企业管理系列讲座第129期

时　间：2018年11月9日（周五）13:30-15:00

主持人：李绪红 教授

主讲人： SHEN, Wei (沈伟)

Arizona State University | W. P. Carey School of Business

Professor of Strategic Management , Department of Management and Entrepreneurship

Associate Dean for China Programs

沈伟教授获得北京大学心理学学士，美国德克萨斯农工大学(Texas A&M)战略管理学博士。曾任职于Rutgers University（罗格斯大学）工商管理学院，University of Florida （佛罗里达大学）灵顿商学院，北京的莫斯科管理学院SKOLKOVO新兴市场研究中心。现兼任ASU凯瑞商学院中国项目副院长，负责ASU凯瑞商学院与中国国家会计学院合办的EMBA项目和与上海高级金融学院合办的DBA项目，是ASU凯瑞商学院MBA项目和DBA项目核心教授团队中的一员。

沈伟教授的主要研究领域包括企业领导人的选拔与继任、高管团队的构成与激励、企业变革、公司治理、组织创新与研发、以及研究方法。他已经在《管理科学季刊》(Administrative Science Quarterly)、《管理学会学报》(Academy of Management Journal)、《管理学会评论》(Academy of Management Review)、《战略管理》(Strategic Management Journal) 等四家全球公认的管理学顶级学术期刊上发表十多篇论文，并且还在其中三家担任编委。

沈伟教授曾于1999年获得美国管理学会商业政策与战略分会的首届Robert J. Litschert最佳博士生论文奖，最近获得德克萨斯农工大学梅斯(Mays)商学院杰出博士毕业生校友奖。

主　题：Organizational Discretion, board control, and shareholder wealth: A contingency perspective

简　介：

We introduce a new theoretical concept—organizational discretion—to characterize the upper limit of managers’ latitude of actions presented by their organizational context, and propose that it moderates the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. Specifically, we first argue that strategic control by boards over managerial decisions reduces managers’ latitude of actions and leads to trade-offs between the containment of managerial opportunism and the pursuit of strategic opportunities, which consequently influence the relationship between strategic control and shareholder wealth. We then suggest that the trade-offs incurred by strategic control over managerial decisions are more prominent in firms with high organizational discretion. Because of the trade-offs, we propose that boards are likely to decide whether to rely more on strategic control or financial control in internal corporate governance based on their firms’ level of organizational discretion. By introducing the concept of organizational discretion and highlighting the trade-offs caused by boards’ strategic control over managerial decisions, we advance a contingency perspective to enhance the understanding about the impact of board control on shareholder wealth. It also bridges the strategic management and corporate governance research on managerial discretion that has largely evolved separately in the literature.

企业管理系 

2018-11-3