德勤-复旦会计论坛系列讲座之一百五十二

 

时 间:2018年11月27日(周二)下午14:00

地 点:史带楼502室

主持人: 朱振梅 副教授

演讲者Edward Lee (The University of Manchester)

 

Title 1:Unintended consequences of economic interventionism on accounting conservatism: A natural experiment

Co-authors: Edward Lee, Kemin Wang, Qiong Wang, and Xin Zhang

Abstract: We examine the impact of government industrial policies on firms’ timely loss recognition. The underlying tension of our study stems from the two competing political economic effects that government interventions could induce on corporate financial reporting incentives. The benevolent (self-serving) government explanation predicts that firms will decrease (increase) accounting conservatism in response to such interventions. We observe that the benevolent government effect dominates, through an identification strategy that exploits the exogenous variations and staggered coverages of industries over time under a natural experiment setting based on China’s unique Five-Year Plans program over 1991–2015. These findings are robust to alternative specifications of accounting conservatism and policy timing, and further analyses reveal the channels and consequences of the effect. Our evidence that industrial policies invoke negative unintended consequences on corporate information environment offers new insights to the interventionist vs free market ideology debate, especially considering the ongoing rise of economic protectionism worldwide.

 

Title 2:Does financial regulation uncertainty affect the mispricing of bank earnings?

Co-authors: Tuan Ho, Edward Lee, Gerald J. Lobo, and Zhenmei (Judy) Zhu

Abstract: We evaluate the influence of financial regulation policy uncertainty on the mispricing of earnings among banks, which is heavily regulated and strongly influenced by such policies. The theoretical rationale and tension of our study are based on two opposing effects. To the extent economic uncertainty generated by the regulatory process can trigger opinion divergence (rational attention) among investors, it is expected to delay (accelerate) the share price responses to banks’ earnings announcements. Consistent with the dominance of the opinion divergence effect, we show regulatory uncertainty, measured through a news-based index, positively relates to post-earnings-announcement drifts and analyst earnings forecast errors among U.S. banks. Our identification strategy also confirms these effects are stronger among banks that are more sensitive to the regulations, i.e. those with lower Tier 1 capital or a greater rise in non-performing loans. Although financial regulations seek to provide capital market stability, our evidence implies that regulatory uncertainty can invoke negative externalities on market information efficiency.

 

会计学系

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