管科系系列讲座第243期预告

时　间：2019年7月16日（周二）09:00

地　点：思源楼524

主持人：田林副教授

主讲嘉宾：Ming Hu is a Professor of Operations Management at Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto

Title：Values of Traceability in Supply Chains

Abstract: Recent development in technologies such as Blockchain has enabled end-to-end traceability of supply chains. When a product failure occurs, such traceability information can be used to identify the suppliers at fault. This could revolutionize supply chain operations for industries where traceability is difficult to achieve under traditional technologies (e.g., agri-food and pharmaceutical). In this paper, we study how traceability can impact supply chain quality contracting. To gain insights into the values of traceability under different supply chain structures, we consider two types of supply chains: 1) parallel supply chains, where all suppliers belong to the same tier of the supply chain and the buyer procures the same material from each supplier, and 2) serial supply chains, where each supplier belongs to a different tier of the supply chain and manages a particular stage of the production process. We identify two issues that arise in quality management with multiple suppliers: 1) the cash flow issue that the suppliers' quality-improving incentives can be capped because the penalty for defect through withholding the product payment is constrained by the retail price of the product, and 2) the double moral hazard issue that the upstream of the supply chain is less incentivized due to the sequential contracting process. We find that while traceability can improve supply chain quality regardless of the supply chain structure, it creates value through different mechanisms under the two distinct supply chain structures. In parallel supply chains, the ability to trace the suppliers creates value by improving the buyer's cash flow feasibility, whereas in serial supply chains, the ability to trace the production process creates value by mitigating double moral hazard. Furthermore, traceability can improve the buyer's profit while reducing the suppliers' profits in parallel supply chains, but it always improves all firms' profits in serial supply chains.

管理科学系

2019-7-9