Title: Does Regulatory Oversight
Discipline ESG Funds to Walk the Talk?
Authors: Dichu Bao (Lingnan University),
Lixin (Nancy) Su (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Chengzhu (Lisa)
Sun (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University), Huai Zhang (Nanyang
Technological University)
Abstract: The possibility that
investment funds use the ESG-investing label to attract investment flows
without making real ESG-oriented investments is a widespread concern.
Exploiting the launch of the SEC¡¯s Climate and ESG Task Force (the Task Force
hereafter), we investigate whether securities regulators¡¯ oversight disciplines the funds to ¡°walk
the talk.¡± Using actual ESG incidents as an objective
ESG performance measure, we show that relative to non-ESG funds, ESG-labeled
funds tilt their investment more toward firms with better ESG performance
after the launch of the Task Force. Such changes are more pronounced among
ESG-labeled funds with poorer pre-launch fund-level ESG performance and those
located closer to the SEC. We further analyze the effect of the Task Force¡¯s enforcement actions and uncover weak evidence that the
enforcement action is effective in forcing ESG funds to better align their
investments with their stated objectives. Collectively, our results suggest
the effectiveness of regulatory oversight in disciplining ESG-labeled funds¡¯ investment decisions.
|