管科系系列讲座第204-206期预告

管科系系列讲座第204期预告

时间：2018年5月18日（周五）13:30

地点：史带楼802

主持人：胡奇英教授

主讲嘉宾： Professor Song is a Professor of Operations Management at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. She is also a special term chaired professor of the School of Management, Fudan University.

Title：Retail Clusters in Developing Economies

Abstract: We develop a game-theoretic model to explore why retail clusters are so popular in developing economiesand when governments should facilitate the formation of retail clusters to improve social welfare. We identify two determinants of retailer clusters. The first isvaluation-cost ratio (consumers' maximum valuation over retailers' production cost), which measures retailers' profit potential. The second isretailer density (the number of retailers over unit transportation cost), which measures competition intensity. These two ratios define four types of clusters: overlapping massive clusters, non-overlapping large clusters, non-overlapping small clusters, and overlapping mini clusters. The socially optimal cluster size is larger than the equilibrium cluster size, and the gap between these two cluster sizes increases in the valuation-cost ratio. (Joint work with Xuying Zhao, Arthur Lim, Hong Guo, Chao Ding)

管科系系列讲座第205期预告

时间：2018年5月25日（周五）10:00

地点：史带楼603

主持人：吴肖乐副教授

主讲嘉宾： Qiaohai (Joice) Hu, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri St. Louis

Title：Capital Structure and Capacity Investment in Supply Chains

Abstract: Because of long lead time associated with product development and capacity building, a supplier must initiate investment in capacity when product and process development are still ongoing.  Since its buyer cannot commit to future terms of trade through a court-enforceable contract, bearing the upfront capacity investment cost, the supplier will under-invest and build capacity below the channel-efficient level.  I demonstrate that the supplier's optimal capacity in the sourcing contract is closely related with its capital structure: If the supplier is very powerful, its optimal capital structure is mixed,  and the under-investment problem is exacerbated; however, if the buyer is very powerful, then the supplier will finance the capacity investment entirely with debt and will over-invest.  For a more balanced power structure, the supply may or may not issue risky debt; correspondingly, it may remain under-investing or become over-investing in capacity

管科系系列讲座第206期预告

时间：2018年5月29日（周二）13:30

地点：史带楼501

主持人：张骏教授

主讲嘉宾： Liu Yunchuan, Full professor, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign(UIUC)

Title：Return Policies in Distribution Channels

Abstract: Many retailers and manufacturers adopt the practice of accepting product returns from consumers (via money-back guarantee) and retailers (via full-credit returns policy) respectively. While the extant literature focuses on either the manufacturer’s or retailer’s returns policy, this paper investigates both returns policies and finds that the manufacturer’s returns policy can actually induce the retailer’s returns policy by increasing the retailer’s salvage value for consumer returns. However, counter to the intuition that an increasing salvage value is always beneficial for retailers, the manufacturer’s returns policy is not necessarily beneficial for competing retailers. Nonetheless, the manufacturer’s returns policy can benefit the manufacturer even when competing retailers face a certain demand before sales, which is in sharp contrast to the extant literature. We also show that a high quality retailer can be more likely to accept returns than a low quality retailer.

管理科学系

2018-5-10