Speaker: Prof. Bo Chen
Chair of Operational Research & Management Science
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick
Venue: Room 303, Starr Building
Time: 10:00—11:30, Tuesday, 2015-1-20
Abstract: A jury of experts is often convened to decide between two states of Nature relevant to a managerial decision. For example, a legal jury decides between “innocent” and “guilty”, while an economic jury decides between “high” and “low” growth when there is an investment decision. Usually the jurors vary in their abilities to determine the actual state. When the jurors make their collective decision by sequential majority voting, the order of voting in terms of juror ability can affect the optimal probability Q of reaching a correct verdict. We show that when the jury has size three, Q is maximized if the juror of middle ability votes first. When voting in this order, sequential voting can close more than 50% of the gap (in terms of Q)between simultaneous voting and the verdict that would be reached without voting if the jurors' private information were made public. Our results have implications for larger juries.
管理科学系
2015年1月15日
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