产业经济学系列讲座168期
时 间：2019年3月19日（周二） 14:30-16:00
地 点：复旦大学管理学院思源楼326室
主 题：The Economics of Political Connection: Local Bureaucrats' Career Concern versus the Corrupt Incentive
主讲人：徐晓书 副教授，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
主持人：从佳佳 博士，复旦大学管理学院助理教授
摘 要：This paper provides a novel micro foundation for the formation and maintenance of political connection, with a simple econometric test to support the theoretical predictions. In a two-stage model, the local bureaucrat sequentially maximizes her payoff by making deals with a local or domestic firm. The initial deal allows its entry in the first stage while the follow-up deal in the second stage enables an obstacle against the threat of outsiders which can be overcome only for sufficiently competitive outsiders. We show that when the local bureaucrat has concerns about local citizens' well-being because of career considerations, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where only highly competitive local firms can afford both deals, which results in active connection. Active connection can be observed with positive probability as long as the bureaucrat does not fully represent local citizens' interests. Moreover, the connection is stubborn when the magnitude of the obstacle is large. The econometric test illustrates the model's explanatory power.
产业经济学系
2019-3-18
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