德勤－复旦会计论坛系列讲座之一百八十三
时 间：2021年5月25日（周二）下午14：00
地 点：史带楼504室
主持人：黄蓉 教授
主讲人：饶品贵 (暨南大学)
主 题：Public Enforcement through Independent Directors
摘 要：We examine whether and how public enforcement can constrain self-dealing activities in emerging markets. Using data from China, we find that firms receiving comment letters concerning related-party transactions (hereafter RPTs) from stock exchanges significantly reduce their RPTs in subsequent years. We also find that (1) independent directors are more likely to dissent or resign after their firms receive RPT comment letters, especially when they have higher career and reputational concerns, and (2) the subsequent reduction in RPTs is also more pronounced when independent directors have such higher concerns. These results suggest that even in emerging markets in which the legal systems are generally weak, public enforcement can still constrain controlling shareholders’ expropriation activities through leveraging independent directors’ reputational incentives. Nonetheless, further investigation indicates that independent directors’ governance effectiveness is moderated by firms’ political connection, ownership concentration, and local legal environment. Our study sheds light on a within-firm mechanism through which public enforcement takes effect.
会计学系
2021-5-21
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