现代产业经济学系列讲座第208期

时    间：2021年6月15日（周二）16:00-17:30

地    点：复旦大学管理学院史带楼603室

题    目：Non-Linear Pricing with Reneging

主讲人：许梦涵 厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院 助理教授

主持人：陆卓然 复旦大学管理学院产业经济学系 助理教授

摘    要：This paper studies a dynamic non-linear pricing problem, adding the possibility that the seller can costly renege on the initial contracts, which is common in reality in the forms of false advertising, add-on pricing and bait-and-switch. While reneging allows the seller to earn more surplus by offering a new full-extraction contract after learning the buyer' s preference, a forward looking buyer will hide information. We fully characterize the equilibrium direct mechanism with the presence of this strategic interaction and show that the quality distortion may be mitigated and participation can be higher when the market moves from full-commitment to one with modest reneging cost. In addition, we show that pooling mechanism can be also optimal since the seller can forgone learning opportunity in order to commit. We establish the precise condition under which the welfare improvement happens and further relate it to whether the market is niche or mass. Moreover, we show that in the sequential equilibrium, there always exists an implementable contract throughout the game even if the seller has already incurred the reneging cost and is free to modify it. By explicitly modeling seller's information extraction problem without full commitment, our results have policy implications on protecting consumers from deceptive business tactics.

主讲人简介：许梦涵，厦门大学经济学院与王亚南经济研究院助理教授。加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校经济学博士，研究领域为微观经济理论、机制设计、产业组织理论等。主要研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory等国际学术期刊上。曾作为项目负责人承担国家自然科学基金等项目。

产业经济学系

2021-6-15