时间:2025年 7月15日(周二)上午10:00
地点:史带楼205教室
主持人: 张新 教授
报告人: Nan Jiang(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
题 目: Group Homogeneity and the Streamlining of Incentive Contracts – Evi-dence from the Pay Distribution Practice of a Hospital
摘 要: We investigate how a specific dimension of group homogeneity – shared professional experience among organizational members – influences managers’ incentive design. We argue that by fostering mutual understanding (effort allocation) and intrinsic motivation (effort exertion), shared professional experience reduces the need to incorporate additional performance information into contracts, allowing managers to adopt more streamlined schemes. Drawing on personnel and performance data from mul-tiple departments within a large general hospital, we provide evidence that departments where physi-cians share greater professional experience are more likely to adopt a more straightforward approach in distributing variable pay, as indicated by less deviation from highly quantifiable individual contribution metrics. Further analyses indicate that these results align more closely with the effort allocation channel than with effort exertion. Moreover, we find that when shared professional experience is high, adopting a more straightforward pay distribution scheme is associated with improved future performance. Over-all, our study sheds light on whether and how group composition affects the effective design of incentive contracts.