时间:2026年11月26日(周四)13:30
地点:史带楼503教室
主持人:金超 青年副研究员
报告人:Chao Tang(The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
题 目:Information Design for Product Innovation under Competition
摘 要:This paper investigates how an innovating firm optimally designs a public information system about the development of a new product when it competes with a rival in the market for an established product. A more informative system allows the firm to tailor its product mix to the prospects of the new product, thereby mitigating competition between its own products. However, because the information is public, the system also guides the rival’s competitive strategy, and the rival’s response makes information costly or beneficial to the firm depending on whether the firm still sells the established product. These two effects jointly determine the optimal information system. We show that the firm provides no information when the market potential of the new product is low and full information when it is high, whereas for intermediate market potential, the firm may provide partial information by certifying success with some probability and pooling all failures with the remaining successes. Our findings help explain why an innovating firm may reveal favorable development outcomes while withholding unfavorable ones.
复旦大学管理学院会计学系