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管理科学系学术讲座

 

时   间：2024年3月19日（周二） 13:30-15:00

地   点：管理学院史带楼601室

主   题：Randomized strategyproof mechanisms with best of both worlds fairness and efficiency

主讲人：Bo Chen（陈礴）  复旦大学特聘教授

主持人：张显东  复旦大学管理学院教授

摘   要：We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents’ best strategy is to report their true preferences) and is expected to ensure fairness and efficiency. We first present an impossibility result that a deterministic mechanism does not exist that is strategyproof, fair and efficient for allocating indivisible chores (i.e., items with disutilities). We then utilize randomness to overcome the strong impossibility. For allocating indivisible chores, we propose a randomized mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation as well as ex-ante and ex-post (best of both worlds) fair and efficient. For allocating mixed items, where an item can be a good (i.e., with a positive utility) for one agent but a chore or another, we propose a randomized mechanism that is strategyproof in expectation with best of both worlds fairness and efficiency when there are two agents.

主讲人简介：陈礴，英国社会科学院院士，运筹学会 (ORS) 会士，数学及其应用学会 (IMA) 会士。英国华威大学教授。自2006年起为诺贝尔经济学奖提名专家。曾获1997年英国经济与社会研究基金会管理学研究奖，2007年英国工程与物理科学研究基金会科学与创新奖。他的主要研究方向包括组合最优化、调度与运输、博弈论与机制设计。

管理科学系

2024-3-14