时间:2019年10月16日(周三)13:30
地点:史带楼205
主持人:张显东教授
主讲嘉宾:Chair of Operations Research & Management Science and Co-director of DIMAP (Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications), University of Warwick, UK.
Title:Capacity Auctions: VCG Mechanism vs. Submodularity
Abstract: We study a form of capacity mechanism that combines capacity and supply auctions. We characterize how participants bid in this auction and show that, on a pay-as-bid basis, an equilibrium behaviour gives Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) profits and achieves efficient outcomes when there is submodularity, which is in stark contrast with what in the existing literature — at equilibrium VCG payments achieve truthful bids and efficiency. We also provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for submodularity.
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