管理科学系学术讲座

时   间：2023年12月26日（周二） 13:30-15:00

地   点：管理学院思源楼524室

主   题：Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power

主讲人：高祖光 加州大学尔湾分校助理教授

主持人：冯天俊 复旦大学管理学院教授

摘   要：

The rapid expansion of distributed energy resources (DERs) is one of the most significant changes to electricity systems around the world. Examples of DERs include solar panels, electric storage, thermal storage, combined heat and power plants, etc. Due to the small supply capacities of these DERs, it is impractical for them to participate directly in the wholesale electricity market. In this talk, we discuss the question of how to integrate these DER supplies into the electricity market, with the objective of achieving full market efficiency. Specifically, we study three aggregation models, where there is an aggregator who procures electricity from DERs, and sells them in the wholesale market. In the first aggregation model, a profit-maximizing aggregator announces a differential two-part pricing policy to the DER owners. We show that this model preserves full market efficiency, i.e., the social welfare achieved by the aggregation model is the same as that when DERs participate directly in the wholesale market. In the second aggregation model, the profit-seeking aggregator is forced to impose a uniform two-part pricing policy to prosumers from the same location, and we numerically show the efficiency loss of this model. In the third aggregation model, a uniform two-part pricing policy is applied to DER owners, while the aggregator becomes fully regulated but is guaranteed positive profit. It is shown that this third model again achieves full market efficiency. Furthermore, we show that DER aggregation also leads to a reduction on the market power of conventional generators. DER aggregation via profit-seeking and/or regulated aggregators have been investigated by CAISO and NYISO, among others, and the recent FERC Order No. 2222 paved the way for aggregators to bid in the wholesale market. Our efficient aggregation models may settle the debate on how DERs should be included in the wholesale electricity market.

简   介:

Zuguang Gao is an Assistant Professor of Operations and Decision Technologies at the Paul Merage School of Business, UC Irvine. He received his PhD in Management Science/Operations Management from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Prior to Chicago, He received the B.S. and M.S. degrees, in 2015 and 2017, respectively, from the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, where he was also affiliated with the Coordinated Science Laboratory. His research interests generally lie in sustainable operations, broadly defined, with a major focus on electricity market design, power/energy systems, and environmental policy, as well as some other areas related to sustainability (such as supply chains). He has worked on a wide range of research projects, drawing tools from mathematical modeling, optimization, control, game theory, reinforcement learning, algorithm design and data analysis. He has also had collaborations with Argonne National Laboratory and industry practitioners (including Uber and Flexport).

时   间：2023年12月26日（周二） 15:00-16:00

地   点：管理学院思源楼524室

主   题：Invoice Tokenization for Deep-Tier Payables Finance

主讲人：Fasheng Xu (许发胜)  University of Connecticut（康涅狄格大学），Assistant Professor

主持人：吴肖乐 复旦大学管理学院教授

摘   要：

Invoices from tier-1 suppliers to the downstream anchor manufacturer can be tokenized onto a blockchain. The tier-1 suppliers are then able to split and transfer the tokens to their own (tier-2) suppliers, enabling deep-tier suppliers to sell tokens and access financing at more affordable rates based on the anchor manufacturer’s credit rating. This paper investigates how invoice tokenization impacts the multitier supply chain’s decisions and profits under different supply network configurations and contractual forms. Our research yields the following main insights. First, invoice tokenization always benefits the downstream manufacturer and the reliable tier-2 supplier, but can hurt the profits of other participants. If the tier-1 supplier allocates the manufacturer’s order between the two tier-2 suppliers with different reliabilities (i.e., in the Y-shaped supply chain), the sourcing strategy switch brought by invoice tokenization makes the unreliable tier-2 supplier worse off with a zero profit. The tier-1 supplier can also be hurt because tier-1’s leverage over the manufacturer is indirectly weakened. If the manufacturer directly decides how much to source from the two tier-2 suppliers through two different tier-1 suppliers (i.e., in the V-shaped supply chain), invoice tokenization reduces the unreliable tier-2 supplier’s production quantity and even decreases the profit when the market potential is relatively large, but the manufacturer never abandons the unreliable branch. Second, when the market potential is relatively small, the manufacturer is more likely to initiate invoice tokenization in the V-shaped supply chain. The result, however, is reversed if the market potential is relatively high. Third, direct control over the wholesale price may hinder the value of invoice tokenization for a supply chain tier. For instance, the tier-1 pricing might allow the manufacturer to extract more value from invoice tokenization in the V-shaped supply chain because of the intensified price competition among tier-1. Finally, a higher credit risk of the manufacturer can increase the value of invoice tokenization, not only for the manufacturer but also for the whole system.

简   介:

Fasheng Xu is an Assistant Professor of Operations and Information Management at School of Business, University of Connecticut (UConn). Fasheng’s general research interests lie in the interface of operations, finance, and economics. In particular, he is interested in studying the economic and social implications of emerging technologies and identifying effective designs and policies for innovative markets and platforms. His recent research has been focused on the following areas: Blockchain/Crypto, FinTech, Supply Chain Finance, Data Privacy, Economics of AI and Foundation Models. His research has been published in leading academic journals such as Management Science and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. He has received several best paper nominations and awards, and the 2022 Guttag Junior Faculty Award at Syracuse University.

Prior to joining UConn in 2023, Fasheng was an Assistant Professor of Supply Chain Management at Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University. Fasheng received his Ph.D. in Operations Management from Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis and B.S. in Industrial Engineering and Operations Research from Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

管理科学系

2023-12-19