管理科学系学术讲座（1月27日）

时   间：2026年1月27日（周二） 10:00-11:30

地   点：管理学院思源楼524室

主   题：Ride-Hailing Platform Coopetition under Fairness-Aware Pricing Regulation

主讲人：钟远光 华南理工大学工商管理学院教授

主持人：冯天俊 复旦大学管理学院教授

Abstract: Ride-hailing aggregators have emerged to integrate multiple ride-hailing companies onto single platforms, enabling customers to choose rides from various providers. These platforms attract many small companies that manage their own driver pools but rely entirely on aggregators to connect with customers. For large ride-hailing companies, partnering with aggregators can potentially expand demand but may impact their existing customers and intensify direct price competition. This raises critical questions: Should large companies join these platforms? What are the implications of such a partnership for small companies, aggregators, consumers, and the society?

In a ride-hailing market involving a large company, a small company, an aggregator, and loyal and disloyal customers, we apply a game-theoretical framework that examines both non-joint and joint settings without/with price regulation. Without regulation, we find that the large company employs a price discrimination strategy by setting a low price on its own app and a higher price on the aggregator (a strategy corroborated by real-world data). This strategy intensifies price competition, ultimately benefiting only the large company while negatively impacting the others. To address these adverse effects, we propose a fairness-aware pricing regulation, imposing an external fairness constraint on the large company’s price difference across its app and the platform. With sufficiently stringent regulation, we find that, despite potentially higher prices from both companies, all players can benefit from the partnership due to reduced competition and enhanced pooling effects of drivers.

Our work provides valuable insight into regulating the ride-hailing industry under fairness constraints. Contrary to the conventional view that higher prices negatively impact customers, we reveal that total consumer surplus can improve under such regulation. Our analysis suggests that large companies should partner with aggregators to maximize their benefits. Meanwhile, small companies, aggregators, and customers can benefit by advocating for stringent fairness-aware pricing regulations.

Bio: 钟远光，华南理工大学工商管理学院副院长，二级教授，兴华杰出学者，博士生导师。中国运筹学会行为运筹学与行为运营管理分会副理事长、管理科学与工程协会理事等。长期致力于供应链库存优化、库存共享与分配、优化理论方法与应用、平台运营等领域的研究，代表性论文发表在MS、OR、MSOM、POM等期刊上。主持国家自科青年A类项目，面上项目和青年C类项目（结题均为特优）以及南网技术、广州供电局、扬腾科技等企业委托项目。入选教育部高层次人才计划青年学者，获得教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果三等奖，广东省哲学社会科学优秀成果奖一等奖和二等奖，安徽省科学技术三等奖，OMEGA Best Paper等奖励。