管科系系列讲座第255-256期预告

管科系系列讲座第255期预告

 

时 间:2019年12月10日(周二)13:30

地 点:史带楼410

主持人:田林副教授(大智慧实验室)

主讲嘉宾 Yulan Wang is currently an associate professor in the Department of the Logistics and Maritime Studies at Faculty of Business of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

主 题Gender-Based Operational Issues Arising from On-Demand Ride-Hailing Platforms: Safety Concerns and System Configuration

摘 要: A critical problem associated with ride-hailing platforms is safety for female users (riders and drivers). One way to resolve or at least alleviate this problem is to migrate from the commonly adopted gender-neutral ``pooling" system that matches riders with drivers without considering gender to a ``hybrid" system with a female-only option. We show that in a pooling system, the marginal improvement in the platform's profit increases with the safety confidence on the rider demand side but diminishes with the safety confidence on the driver supply side. Therefore, platforms should improve female riders' safety confidence as much as possible while ensuring that female drivers' safety confidence is sufficiently high. Interestingly, we demonstrate that increasing driver safety confidence may not lead to more female riders joining the pooling system. We find that in a hybrid system, flexibility should not be fully granted to female drivers because it can jeopardize the efficiency of the system. Switching from a pooling system to a hybrid system can result in a win-win outcome on the two most important goals, increasing the accessibility for safety-concerned female users and improving the platform's profitability. Our results provide a plausible explanation for the adoption of different systems in countries with differing levels of female safety.

 

管科系系列讲座第256期预告

 

时 间:2019年12月10日(周二)14:45

地 点:史带楼410

主持人:田林副教授(大智慧实验室)

主讲嘉宾 Xiaomeng Guo is an Assistant Professor at Department of Logistics and Maritime Study, Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

主 题: Inventory Sharing under Service Quality Competition

摘 要:In many markets with demand uncertainties, competing firms may share inventories for common product components that they use to offer consumers services. This paper examines how the competitors’ sharing of product inventory affects their inventory and service-quality decisions. We develop a game-theoretical game in which two retailers offer the same core product but compete for customers by offering bundled services with the product. The consumer’s purchase process is subject to some stochastic uncertainties that can potentially lead to no purchase. When a retailer runs out of stock of the product, it may replenish its inventory directly from the supplier, or/and request the leftover inventory from the competitor if they have entered into an inventory-sharing contract beforehand. We find that with inventory-sharing contract the retailers’ service level decreases in the transfer price when inventory is exogenously given and is non-monotone in the transfer price when inventory is an endogenous decision. Moreover, the service level can be higher or lower than that without inventory-sharing contract, which indicates that whether inventory sharing will soften or intensify the service competition depends on the transfer price. We also find that the retailers’ optimal inventory levels will increase in the transfer price of the inventory-sharing contract and can be higher or lower than that without the inventory-sharing contract.  Furthermore, in equilibrium with symmetric inventories, inventory sharing may make both retailers worse off for any transfer price when the shipping cost for transferring inventory from one retailer to the other is high.

 

 

 

管理科学系

2019-11-22