信息管理与商业智能系学术讲座

 

时    间:5月24日(周三)10:30-12:00

地    点:李达三楼105室

主持人:信息管理与商业智能系 窦一凡 教授

题    目:IT service sourcing with information asymmetry

报告人:黄河 教授,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授

简    介:黄河,清华大学经济管理学院博士,国家杰出青年科学基金获得者、教育部新世纪优秀人才,现任重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授。研究兴趣包括,机制设计、信息管理、拍卖理论等。黄河教授以第一作者在Management Science、MISQ、ISR、POM、DSJ、Omega等国际期刊发表代表作多篇。主持国家自然科学基金项目5项,评估为“特优”1项。从事《运筹学》《随机建模与优化》《拍卖理论与机制设计》等课程教学。入选中国信息经济学乌家培资助计划,以第一获奖人获得中国信息经济学优秀成果奖、重庆市社科优秀成果奖、重庆市教学成果奖等。担任国际期刊ECRA资深编辑、ITEM副主编、JSSSE编委,担任MISQ、ISR、POM等审稿人。担任中国信息经济学会常务理事、数智决策与信息治理专委会主任、中国系统工程学会理事、国际信息系统协会中国分会(CNAIS)常务理事、中国运筹学会博弈论分会常务理事等。曾为美国哥伦比亚大学、香港科技大学、香港理工大学访问学者。

摘    要:Motivated by challenges facing IT procurement, this paper studies a hybrid procurement model in which a reverse auction of a fixed-price IT outsourcing contract may be followed by renegotiation to extend the contract’s scope. In this model, the buyer balances the needs to incentivize noncontractible vendor investment and to curb the winning vendor’s information rent by choosing the initial project scope and the buyer’s investment in the quality of the project. We find that a buyer may benefit from inducing ex post renegotiation to motivate vendor investment, especially when the winning vendor has high bargaining power and the quality uncertainty is low. Broadening the initial scope reduces information rent but leaves little room for ex post renegotiation and, hence, discourages vendor investment, whereas increasing the buyer’s investment has opposite effects. Interestingly, the two measures can be strategic substitutes or complements depending on the likelihood of the renegotiation and the two parties’ bargaining powers. The buyer may strategically set a low initial project scope and high investment to incentivize renegotiation and vendor investment, which may explain why many IT outsourcing projects start small and allow expansions. Our findings also generate several testable predictions for IT outsourcing.

 

 

 

信息管理与商业智能系

2023-5-8