时 间:2024年11月5日(周二) 13:30-15:00
地 点:复旦管院思源楼326室
题 目:On Mechanism Underlying Algorithmic Collusion
主讲人: 赵玮 讲师(中国人民大学经济学院)
主持人:邵翔 副教授
摘 要:
Abstract: Two issues of algorithmic collusion are addressed in this paper. First, we show that in a general class of symmetric games, including Prisoner's Dilemma, Bertrand competition, and any (nonlinear) mixture of first and second price auction, only (strict) Nash Equilibrium (NE) is stochastically stable. Therefore, the tacit collusion is driven by failure to learn NE due to insufficient learning, instead of learning some strategies to sustain collusive outcomes. Second, we study how algorithms adapt to collusion in real simulations with insufficient learning. Extensive explorations in early stages and discount factors inflates the Q-value, which interrupts the sequential and alternative price undercut and leads to bilateral rebound. The process is iterated, making the price curves like Edgeworth cycles. When both exploration rate and Q-value decrease, algorithms may bilaterally rebound to relatively high common price level by coincidence, and then get stuck. Finally, we accommodate our reasoning to simulation outcomes in the literature, including optimistic initialization, market design and algorithm design.
主讲人简介:
赵玮,中国人民大学经济学院讲师。博士毕业于巴黎高等商学院,研究方向为算法与数据经济学,网络理论。研究论文发表于《 International Economic Review》,《Games and Economic Behavior》以及《Theoretical Economics》等知名国际期刊。
应用经济学系
2024-10-10
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