德勤－复旦会计论坛系列253期讲座
时间：2025年 6月19日（周四）下午1:30
地点：李达三楼105教室
主持人: 金超 青年副研究员
报告人: 李莘檑 Xinlei Li（UC Davis Graduate School of Management）
题 目: Lender-borrower Interactions and Loan Contracting
摘 要: In commercial lending, lenders interact with borrowers to source new loans and acquire information. We leverage unique proprietary data from a global bank to examine the determinants of lender-borrower interactions and their role in loan contracting. We first show that loan officers’ interactions with borrowers are driven by borrowers’ business prospects and risk level, consistent with loan officers using them to source new loans and assess credit worthiness respectively. Next, we find that loans initiated following interactions are priced more efficiently, i.e., their interest rates are more predictive of future defaults, than loans not following interactions, especially when interactions are more likely to result in new information. Last, we find evidence consistent with loan officers using the information from interactions to grant loans but not to reject loans, and that this asymmetric use of information in loan approval is more pronounced when loan officers have higher loan prospecting incentives. Taken together, our study provides novel evidence on the drivers of loan officers’ interactions with borrowers and how these interactions influence loan pricing and approval decisions.
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