现代产业经济学系列讲座第210期
时 间：2021年10月26日（周二）15:30-17:00
地 点：复旦大学管理学院史带楼302室
题 目：Information design in oligopolies
主讲人：杨仁琨 暨南大学经济学院 助理教授
主持人：陆卓然 复旦大学管理学院 助理教授
摘 要：We consider an oligopoly model in which firms choose how much quality information to release before launching a new product and competing in price. In particular, firms have credibility and full flexibility in the choice of signal structures regarding their own products. When there is one-sided incomplete information, a “pass or fail” information structure is optimal: the entrant only reveals whether its product quality exceeds a certain threshold. When there is two-sided incomplete information, both firms reveal more information to avoid Bertrand competition. We identify sufficient conditions for a full revelation equilibrium. We further characterize the consumer- and social-optimal information structures and show that competition leads to excessive disclosure compared to these two benchmarks.
主讲人简介：杨仁琨，暨南大学经济学院助理教授，博士毕业于俄亥俄州立大学经济系，硕士毕业于威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济系，本科毕业于北京大学元培学院。目前从事的研究领域包括动态机制设计，信息设计与产业组织理论。
产业经济学系
2021-10-26
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